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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-1860 
 
DIANNE L. BASS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF 
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHNNY BUTLER, SECRETARY OF 
LABOR AND INDUSTRY FOR THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; RICHARD A. 
HIMLER, DIRECTOR OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU 
OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION; COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, THROUGH D. MICHAEL FISHER, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No.: 98-cv-4112 
District Judge: Honorable Charles R. Weiner 
 
Argued: January 23, 2001 
 
Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 9, 2001) 
 
 
  
       For the Appellant: 
        Michael H. Landis, Esquire 
         (Argued) 
        Ronald J. Smolow, Esquire 
        Smolow & Landis 
        204 Two Neshaminy Interplex 
        Trevose, PA 19053 
 
       For the Appellees: 
        Claudia M. Tesoro, Esquire 
         (Argued) 
        Office of the Attorney General 
        21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor 
        Philadelphia, PA 19107-3603 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Dianne Bass ("Bass"), alleging that the Pennsylvania 
Workers Compensation system denied her benefits through 
unconstitutional procedures, filed this federal class action 
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and two of its 
officials. Bass complained that the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Workers Compensation denied her claim without notice 
that her case was reassigned to, and decided by, workers 
compensation judges ("WCJs") who were neither present 
nor presiding when her witnesses testified. Bass also 
complained that the Pennsylvania statute allowing WCJs to 
make credibility determinations and ultimate decisions 
without hearing any witness testimony permitted the taking 
of property without Due Process of law. 1 Bass sought 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute in question is referr ed to as "Section 415 of the Workers 
Compensation Act," and states: 
 
       Transfer of petition to another refer ee. 
 
       At any time before an award or disallowance of compensation or 
       order has been made by a referee to whom a petition has been 
       assigned, the department may order such petition heard before any 
       other referee. Unless the department shall otherwise order, the 
       testimony taken before the original refer ee shall be considered as 
       though taken before the substituted refer ee. 
 
       77 P.S. S 851 ("Section 415"). 
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declaratory and injunctive relief, costs, and attorneys fees, 
but no damages. 
 
The District Court, dismissing Bass's action without 
prejudice, abstained in deference to appellate proceedings 
in the Pennsylvania courts. Bass filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Since the 
District Court's order of dismissal and denial of 
reconsideration, Bass has unsuccessfully exhausted her 
state court remedies. Bass appealed from the order denying 
reconsideration. We will vacate the or der of dismissal and 
remand the action for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
The first filed action was Bass's state court claim for 
workers compensation benefits. She filed her federal action 
approximately six years later. T iming is critical in this 
action, so important dates will be stated. None of the facts 
are contested by the parties. 
 
A. The Pennsylvania Action 
 
Bass filed a workers compensation claim petition on 
November 30, 1992, alleging that she sustained a 
workplace injury on December 20, 1990; she later amended 
the date of injury to January 8, 1991. The parties 
bifurcated the issue of whether Bass sustained her injury 
in the scope of her employment. On October 28, 1994, 
Workers Compensation Judge ("WCJ") Car ol Mickey held 
that Bass was injured within the scope of her employment. 
Before deciding the balance of Bass's case, WCJ Mickey 
resigned, and Bass's case was transferr ed to WCJ Peter 
Perry. WCJ Perry received additional testimony and 
evidence but, before closing the recor d, he transferred the 
case to WCJ Michael Rosen. Bass was never notified of the 
transfer to WCJ Rosen, as required by Pennsylvania law. 
 
After more than five and one-half years had elapsed since 
filing her claim, two judges who had never hear d the 
claimant or all of her witnesses jointly signed a decision on 
August 8, 1996, denying Bass's claim. The Workers 
Compensation Appeal Board ("Appeal Boar d") affirmed. 
Bass appealed, arguing, inter alia, that she was denied due 
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process by the participation of WCJ Rosen. The 
Commonwealth Court vacated the Appeal Board's order and 
remanded to allow Bass to establish prejudice arising from 
the assignment of her claim to WCJ Rosen without notice. 
See Appx. 325a ("Commonwealth Court's First Opinion"). 
The Appeal Board, after considering oral ar gument and 
briefs, concluded that Bass failed to establish pr ejudice. 
See Appx. 83a, 155a. The Appeal Board r einstated the 
August 8, 1996 order denying relief. On February 18, 2000, 
the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Appeal Board, 
stating: 
 
       In Bass' [sic] first appeal to this court, we addressed 
       her challenge to the assignment of WCJ Rosen without 
       prior notice to her. . . . At that time, Bass received the 
       appropriate relief in the form of a remand for a 
       determination of whether the assignment to WCJ 
       Rosen without . . . prior notice . . . resulted in 
       prejudice. . . . As the Board noted, on r emand Bass 
       failed to make any showing of prejudice but simply 
       argued that substitution is inherently pr ejudicial. . . . 
 
       . . . Bass cannot now assert for the first time that 
       Section 415 of the Workers' Compensation Act is 
       unconstitutional. By her failure to challenge the 
       constitutionality of Section 415 in her first appeal to 
       this court and failure to notify the Attor ney General of 
       a facial attack on the statute, Bass has waived this 
       issue. . . . In any case, . . . the participation of WCJ 
       Rosen did not deprive Bass of a fair adjudication by a 
       qualified fact-finder. 
 
Appx. 156a-159a ("Commonwealth Court's Second 
Opinion"). The Court concluded that even though her facial 
challenge was procedurally barred, Section 415 was 
constitutional. See Appx. 159a. The Commonwealth Court 
also rejected Bass's claim that she was entitled to discovery 
to create an evidentiary record in support of her claim of 
actual prejudice. The Court reasoned that Bass was not 
entitled to inquire into the deliberations of the tribunals 
that decided her case. See Appx. 159a. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Bass's petition 
for allocatur. 
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B. The Federal Action 
 
Bass brought her federal action under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 
against the Director of the Pennsylvania Bur eau of Workers 
Compensation, the Secretary of Labor and Industry for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. None of these defendants were parties to her 
workers compensation action in the state proceedings. 
Johnny Butler and Richard Himler, the Secretary of Labor 
and Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers 
Compensation respectively, twice moved to dismiss without 
success; they later answered the complaint. In a 
Memorandum and Order on April 30, 1999, the District 
Court held that Bass pleaded a protected pr operty interest, 
and that Younger and Colorado River abstention were 
inappropriate because the workers compensation 
proceedings were still in the administrative courts, which 
had no authority to decide constitutional issues. See Appx. 
173a-175a. 
 
The District Court held hearings on August 30 and 
September 7, 1999. WCJs Peter Perry and Michael Rosen 
testified about their roles in Bass's workers compensation 
case. WCJs Perry and Rosen testified that they had jointly 
authored the decision denying Bass's benefits, although 
WCJ Mickey had heard most of the live testimony. 
 
On January 6, 2000, the District Court directed the 
parties to file dispositive motions; the parties complied. On 
February 3, 2000, the District Court entered an order 
stating that: 
 
       [T]he interests of comity would best be served by 
       allowing the Pennsylvania courts (in which [Bass] 
       currently has an action similar to action sub judice 
       pending before the Commonwealth Court) . . . tofirst 
       adjudicate [Bass's claim that her due process rights 
       were denied because her case was not decided by a 
       WCJ who actually heard the case and observed the 
       witnesses and to determine] the constitutionality of 
       Section 415 . . . . 
 
Appx. 271a. The District Court dismissed Bass's case 
without prejudice to her "reinstating the suit after all 
appeals are exhausted in the Pennsylvania state courts." 
 
                                5 
  
Appx. 271-72. Days later, the Commonwealth Court 
decided Bass's second appeal adversely to her . She moved 
the District Court for reconsideration. On May 18, 2000, 
the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, 
and ordered that it would continue to abstain because Bass 
had not exhausted all of her appeals in the Pennsylvania 
courts, and because "the decision of the Commonwealth 
Court which rejected plaintiff's due pr ocess claims and 
upheld the constitutionality of [Section 415] is res judicata 
on this court." Appx. 284. The District Court cited Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Colorado River Water 
Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), but 
performed no further abstention analysis. See Appx. 283a. 
The District Court explained that Bass's only further 
recourse was to appeal her state action to the Pennsylvania 
and United States Supreme Courts. See Appx. 284a. 
 
II. 
 
Bass's compensation claim has now run the course of 
Pennsylvania's judicial system, from the workers 
compensation process to the Pennsylvania Supr eme Court. 
After the District Court entered its final or der, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur; there are no 
longer pending state proceedings. Cf. Melvin v. 
Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301, 305 (3d Cir . 1988) ("[W]e 
sometimes take judicial notice of subsequent developments 
not part of the district court record.") (citing Landy v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)). Hence, abstention 
is now inapplicable because it provides for federal deference 
to ongoing, not completed, parallel state pr oceedings. See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water 
Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); 
Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1157, 1157 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1993). As the District Court contemplated (see  order of 
February 3, 2000), Bass may now resume her federal 
action. The primary basis of Bass's appeal -- that 
abstention was inappropriate -- is moot. Ther efore, vacatur 
and remand is appropriate. See Davis v. Rendell, 659 F.2d 
374, 376 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he issues raised as to the 
procedure followed by the district court in ruling on the 
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abstention claim and the correctness of that ruling itself 
are concededly moot, and a remand would appear to be 
appropriate"); see also Melvin, 864 F.2d at 305 ("[W]e do not 
think it would be appropriate for us to simply notice the 
subsequent action of the New Jersey court and then decide 
the preclusion issue.") 
 
The District Court did not proceed beyond abstention in 
considering this case,2 but the defendants on appeal raised 
serious questions, asserting that the Commonwealth 
Court's decisions are inextricably intertwined with Bass's 
attempted federal court Constitutional challenges to Section 
415. Therefore, they contend that her challenges to the 
workers compensation law is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. The defendants also assert complicated questions 
pertaining to claim and issue preclusion, even though the 
defendants in the federal action appear to dif fer somewhat 
from those in the state action. See Chur chill v. Star 
Enterprises, 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir . 1999) (claim 
preclusion requires party identity or privity). Each of these 
defenses are vigorously contested by the plaintiffs. In the 
procedural posture of the case then befor e the able and 
experienced District Court, it did not have the benefit of 
oral argument, briefs of the parties, and the opportunity to 
decide these complex issues. Additionally, we ar e concerned 
with class certification and the justiciability of the class 
claims, which the District Court judiciously held in 
abeyance. 
 
Under the facts and posture of the case, we believe it 
appropriate for the District Court to deter mine in the first 
instance the threshold issues, including jurisdiction, 
preclusion, and class certification. Of course, if Bass passes 
the threshold, she will be entitled to full judicial process on 
the merits. The prudential value of having the benefit of 
District Court consideration and analysis outweighs the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court mentioned res judicata in its final order, but the 
comment was dicta and was unsupported by any rationale. In this case, 
res judicata is a difficult question r equiring substantial analysis if 
the 
District Court reaches it on remand. The District Court would not reach 
it should the Court conclude that the Rooker -Feldman doctrine divests it 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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judicial economy of having this Court dispose of these 
issues now.3 
 
Ordinarily, we would dismiss this appeal because a stay 
like the one entered by the District Court her e usually is 
not a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C.S 1291. However, 
because of the inordinate time consumed by this litigation 
in the state and federal courts, and the District Court's 
order dismissing without prejudice to r einstatement of the 
litigation after exhaustion of remedies in the state courts, 
we will remand the case to the District Court. 4 
 
III. 
 
The Order of the District Court will be vacated, and the 
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Costs taxed against the appellees. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3. We make no judgment whether the District Court committed legal 
error by abstaining. We base our decision on undisputed events 
occurring after the District Court entered itsfinal order. 
 
4. Our disposition has the same practical ef fect as dismissing the 
appeal, 
and leaves Bass in the same position as if she r e-filed her action in 
federal court following the Pennsylvania courts' disposition of her state 
claims. There being "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy," Ruhrgas AG 
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999), we are within our power 
to decide the jurisdictional issue of mootness befor e reaching the much 
more complicated issue of whether we have appellate jurisdiction. Cf. 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 101 n.3 (1998) 
(tacitly affirming the practice of deciding Younger abstention issues 
before determining whether there is a case or controversy). Judge Alito 
would dismiss the appeal. 
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